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ABSTRACT
MSE walls are widely used in site development, primarily due to their low cost when compared with conventional retaining structures;
however, the costs to repair or reconstruct a poorly performing wall likely outweigh these initial savings. This paper includes a
summary of three MSE walls that have experienced either a complete failure (collapse) or have undergone significant movement,
adversely affecting wall performance. In each case history, the likely cause of failure and the solution for rehabilitation of the
structures are presented, along with the approximate cost of repair. Several projects in which other methods of stabilization were used
are also presented in limited detail. Methods of repair or stabilization are compared with regard to constructibility, cost, and their
applicability to various failure mechanisms and site constraints.

INTRODUCTION

CASE HISTORIES

MSE walls have become a staple to both commercial and
residential development over the last 10 to 20 years. This is
the result of improved understanding of the systems and
design methodologies, but primarily because of their
significant cost benefit over conventional retaining structures.

Three case histories are reviewed in detail herein, and several
others are discussed for comparison. All of the case histories
are located in the eastern United States. Parameters describing
the wall and the design of each structure are defined as
follows:

Prior to the advent of the geosynthetic reinforced Segmental
Retaining Wall (SRW), MSE walls were common to large
highway projects. These systems typically consist of pre-cast
concrete facing elements with metallic reinforcement, and
backfill within the reinforced zone is nearly always specified
as a free draining processed aggregate or sand. Alternatively,
on-site soils (often fine grained) are commonly used for SRW
construction, creating an even more cost-effective structure.
The cost of geosynthetic reinforced walls has been shown to
be over 25 percent less than walls with metallic reinforcement,
and about half the cost of more traditional gravity walls
(Koerner et al., 1998).

Height: Maximum exposed wall height
Geogrid Length: Length of geogrid measured from face of
wall
Backfill: Classification of soil within the reinforced zone
according to ASTM D2488
Unit Weight: Soil unit weight (moist) used in design
Internal Soil Friction Angle, φ: Soil friction angle used in
design

The cost benefits of MSE walls can be far outweighed by
repair costs and lost revenue from a wall that does not perform
as intended. There have been numerous failures of MSE
structures, often attributed to poor construction practices,
overly aggressive designs, the use of unsuitable soils as
backfill, and/or lack of internal drainage of the structures.
There are numerous methods used to stabilize poorly
performing walls, and their application is dependent upon the
site constraints, cost of repair, and the mode of failure of the
MSE wall.

Paper No. 5.30

Case History 1: SRW Failure (Reith et al., 1999)
This geogrid-reinforced SRW located in southeastern
Pennsylvania was constructed in the Summer of 1997. Wall
design parameters were as follows:
Table 1. Wall Design Parameters
Height
Geogrid Length
Backfill
Unit Weight
Internal Soil Friction Angle, φ

28 ft [8.3 m]
16 ft [4.9 m]
SM, ML
120 pcf [18.8 kN/m3]
32°
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The wall design also included a 4 ft [1.2 m] thick layer of
drainage stone (AASHTO No. 57) behind the facing along
with a blanket drain at the bottom of the wall that extended
beyond the back of the reinforced zone. Figure 1 illustrates
the wall section as designed.

Fig. 1. Typical Design Wall Section.

Fig. 2. Photograph of First Failure.

First Failure. About 5 months after construction of the wall
was completed, a failure occurred. Prior to the failure, no
signs of distress were reported. The failure occurred during a
relatively wet winter and spring, and followed several
significant rain events. Additionally, it was reported that a
few days before the failure, the fire protection system was
tested, releasing a large amount of water onto the parking lot
above the retaining wall. The wall failure was generally
centered on a stormwater inlet to which the parking lot
drained.

Table 2. Summary of Laboratory and Field Data

As indicated in the photograph (Fig. 2), the failure was
relatively shallow and the majority of the reinforced zone
remained intact (only the facing and drainage stone collapsed).
The dismantling of the wall was closely observed by several
geotechnical engineers. Soil samples were collected and
laboratory testing performed. The soils classified as Silty
Sand (SM) and Sandy Silt (ML) with between 20 and 50
percent passing the No. 200 sieve. A Modified Proctor test
(ASTM D1557) was performed on material obtained from the
failure area. Additionally, in-place density testing was
performed on the soil during dismantling. Laboratory and
field results are summarized in Table 2. Laboratory data
shown is the optimum moisture content and the maximum dry
density according to ASTM D1557.

Dry Density
Moisture
Content

Laboratory
Proctor
(ASTM D1557)

Field Compaction
(ASTM D1587,
D2922)

123 pcf
[19.3 kN/m3]

89-100 pcf
[14.0-15.7 kN/m3]

10.8 %

18-33%

The results indicate that the material was not adequately
compacted and wet of optimum. It is also possible that the
materials tested in the field had undergone deformation due to
the failure, lowering their density. The daily field reports
prepared by the geotechnical engineer’s representatives during
construction indicated that the material was placed and
compacted to at least 95% of the maximum dry density.
Observations during removal of the wall indicated that the
geogrid reinforcement was generally placed at the locations
and to the lengths specified on the design drawings; however,
the drainage stone at the face of the wall did not appear to
have been placed as specified. The thickness of the stone
ranged from the design thickness of 4 ft [1.2 m] down to less
than 1 foot [0.3 m] and it appeared that in several areas, the
drainage stone was contaminated with soil.
Removal of the stormwater pipe that flowed from the
stormwater inlet revealed that the pipe joints were not sealed,
several joints were open, and the bell of the pipe was broken at
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one joint. Both the pipe and inlet were bedded on stone that
was likely connected to the facing drainage layer of the SRW.
The location and type of failure, poorly constructed storm
drain, and timing of the collapse all pointed to hydrostatic
pressure as the cause of failure. Additionally, the fact that the
wall collapsed without showing significant signs of movement
suggests a failure resulting from the relatively sudden
introduction of large volumes of water to the drainage system.
Second Failure. About two months after the first failure was
repaired (see next section for details on repair), tension cracks
and settlement of the pavement above a separate section of the
SRW were observed. Over the next two to three months, the
cracks opened wider and settlement continued to nearly 8
inches [20 cm] of vertical displacement (see Fig. 3). The wall
also began to bulge near its midpoint and finally collapsed.

Wall Repair. Because the SRW collapsed completely, reconstruction was believed to be the most efficient and costeffective means of repair for the two failed sections.
The first failed section was repaired using the original design
geogrid lengths and spacing; however, a dense-graded
aggregate was used in place of the on-site soils. A higher
strength geogrid was also used to account for possible
installation damage caused by the aggregate fill.
The second failed section was repaired similarly; however,
geogrid lengths were increased by about 5 ft [1.5 m]. Dense
graded aggregate was also used as backfill for this section.
The total cost of reconstruction of the two collapsed sections
is estimated to be about $100,000, which corresponds to about
$35/s.f. [$377/m2] of wall face. This compares to an original
estimated construction cost of $15/s.f. Additionally,
engineering fees to evaluate the failures (including field
investigations and laboratory testing) and provide additional
design and construction oversight are estimated at $50,000 (or
$18/s.f.).
The integrity of the remainder of the SRW remains
questionable; however, the owner has chosen not to perform
additional studies or repair any of the remaining sections. The
wall has performed adequately to date.
Case History 2: SRW Failure

Fig. 3. Second failure prior to collapse.
The relatively slow, progressive failure of this section
contrasted the first failure, which occurred without warning.
Additionally, the reinforced zone experienced significant
movement and the failure more closely resembled a classic
wedge or log-spiral type failure.
A subsurface exploration was performed between the initial
identification of movement and the eventual failure. The
exploration included test borings along the entire wall length.
Standard penetration testing (SPT) was performed and
undisturbed samples were obtained for direct shear and inplace density tests. The results of the testing indicated that the
reinforced soils were in a loose to very loose state, field
compaction was in the range of 80 to 90 percent of the
maximum dry density, and the moisture content of the samples
was well above optimum. Additionally, direct shear testing
indicated effective friction angles (φ) ranging from 30.5 to
33.7 degrees.
The second failure was attributed to poor compaction of the
reinforced soils along with hydrostatic build up within the
reinforced zone (likely due to poorly constructed drainage,
similar to the first failure).
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This geogrid reinforced SRW is located in northern Georgia.
Construction was completed in summer, 1994. Wall design
parameters were as follows:
Table 3. Wall Design Parameters
Height
Geogrid Length
Backfill
Unit Weight
Internal Soil Friction Angle, φ

26 ft [8.0 m]
13.5 ft [4.1 m]
SM, SC
130 pcf
30°

The original design included a 1-ft [0.3-m] layer of drainage
stone behind the block facing, and a drainage composite at the
back of the reinforced zone.
A concrete flume was
constructed at the top of the wall to collect runoff from the
hillside above the wall and direct it to the storm drainage
system.
Wall Failure. The highest section of the SRW failed in March
1996 during a heavy rainstorm. There is little data available
regarding the condition of the wall prior to the failure. The
owner contracted with an engineering consultant to evaluate
the design of the wall and the failure. The findings of this
evaluation included the following comments:
• The geogrid reinforcement was shorter and vertical
spacing was greater than would normally be expected for
this type of structure.
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•
•
•

Graded aggregate was used in lieu of the open graded
stone specified for drainage stone.
The wall face was constructed vertically instead of at the
1H:16V batter specified in the design.
The concrete flume appeared to have been constructed in
a manner that promoted flow along the ground surface
upslope of the flume, causing erosion of this material and
possibly infiltration into the reinforced mass.

The engineer concluded that all of these conditions may have
contributed to the wall collapse, and recommended that the
wall be reconstructed using a more conservative design with
proper drainage, and runoff either be redirected away from the
wall or the flume properly constructed.
The failed area of the wall was cleaned up and the intact SRW
blocks were stockpiled on site. The wall remained in this
condition (see Fig. 4) until April 1998 when additional
analyses were performed and engineering design for
reconstruction and repair of the wall was initiated (by an
engineering firm not involved in the previous investigations).

regraded. This reduced the height of this intact section
(increasing stability) and provided additional blocks to use in
reconstruction of the failed section. The design for the
reconstructed portion utilized on-site fill (or soil borrow) for
the reinforced zone, and geogrid lengths were increased by 1.5
ft [0.4 m] in the lower one-third of the wall, and 5 ft [1.5 m] in
the upper portions. Drainage stone was included behind the
block facing, and a drainage composite was installed behind
the reinforced zone extending from the base of the wall to
within 8 ft [2.4 m] of the top of wall.
Soil nails were used to stabilize the remaining portions of the
SRW. Two rows of soil nails spaced at 5 ft [1.5 m] vertically
and 7.5 ft [2.3 m] horizontally were installed through the SRW
block facing. An 8-inch [0.2-m] thick shotcrete facing was
provided to a height of about 8 ft [2.4 m] in front of the SRW.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the soil nail stabilization.
The grading above the wall was modified to redirect some
runoff away from the wall. Portions of the concrete flume
were removed, and a vegetated swale was used to replace the
concrete flume above the failed section.

Fig. 4. Photograph of failed section.
Wall Repair. Analyses were performed to evaluate the
stability of the non-failed portions of the SRW. A parametric
evaluation was performed for the existing wall geometry and
reinforcement layout with varying soil properties. The results
indicated marginal factors of safety for both internal and
external stability, with the critical failure being a compoundtype failure plan extending from the wall face at about onethird the wall height to just beyond the reinforcement. This
surface corresponded reasonably with the actual failure that
occurred.

Fig. 5. Soil Nail Stabilization - Typical Section.

The owner was presented with the results of this analysis and
chose to reconstruct the failed portion of the wall and provide
stabilization for the remainder of the wall. Preliminary
evaluations indicated that stabilization using tiebacks or soil
nails was more cost effective than demolition and
reconstruction of the entire wall.
For the failed section of the wall, regrading above the wall
would be performed to reduce the height of the wall by as
much as 3 ft [0.9 m]. A 100± ft [30 m] long intact section
remained between the failure and the end of the wall. The top
block courses were removed from this section and the backfill
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Fig. 6. Photograph of stabilized portion of wall using soil
nails and shotcrete.
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The cost for reconstruction of the failed section (about 5,500
s.f. [510 m2]) of the wall was $120,000, or about $22/s.f.
[$237/m2]. This included regrading above the wall.
About 2,500 s.f of block were salvaged and re-used from the
original failure and dismantling of portions of the wall.
Soil nail stabilization cost was $180,000, which equates to
about $40/s.f [$430/m2] for the 4,500 s.f [420 m2] of soil nail
wall; however, the net unit cost to stabilize the 10,800 s.f.
[1000 m2] of SRW was about $17/s.f. [$180/ m2].

Wall Movement. In December 2002, cracks in the pavement
appeared above the wall. Additionally, the backfill between
the top of wall and the curb showed signs of surface erosion.
Survey points along the curb above the wall were established
to monitor horizontal and vertical movement over a threemonth period. Movements were detected and the cracking
above the wall increased (Fig. 8). The area between the wall
face and the curb also continued to erode, likely caused by
several heavy rain events during the monitoring period.

Case History 3: Wrap Face Wall
This wall, located in central South Carolina, is a geogridreinforced structure with a wrapped, vegetated facing. The
facing system consists of a geogrid and erosion control blanket
wrapped within a welded-wire fabric form. The face of the
wall has a batter of 1H:18V. Original construction was
completed in the Fall of 2001. Wall design parameters were
as follows:
Table 4. Wall Design Parameters
Height
Geogrid Length
Backfill
Unit Weight
Internal Soil Friction Angle, φ

29 ft [8.8 m]
16 ft [4.9 m]
SM, ML
130 pcf [20.4 kN/m3]
32°

A stone chimney drain was provided at the back of the
reinforced zone. The wall was constructed on an existing
steep slope (1.5H:1V) where partially weathered rock was
present at the surface in some areas and at a maximum
estimated depth of 5 ft. The foundation for the highest portion
of the wall consisted of disintegrated rock. A typical section
of the wall is shown in Fig. 7.

Fig. 8. Photograph showing tension cracks above wall.
Field investigations, including test pits and installation of
inclinometers, were promptly initiated. The shallow test pit
indicated that the soils (sandy silts) appeared to have been
compacted in accordance with the specifications. A bulk
sample was obtained from the test pit, and direct shear testing
was performed on a recompacted sample. The results of the
testing indicated that if the material was properly compacted,
the effective friction angle should have been greater than that
assumed in design of the wall. The inclinometer data
confirmed the lateral movement of the reinforced mass with
readings of about 0.05 inch [0.13 cm] per day over a 6-week
period. This prompted design of stabilization measures.
Wall Stabilization. Although the reasons for the initial
instability were not clear, it was apparent that surface water
infiltration was a major contributor to the continuing
movement, and failure was likely. A stabilization design was
developed using driven mechanical earth anchors. To design
the anchors, a stability analysis was performed, and the soil
parameters were adjusted until a factor of safety of about 1.0
was obtained for a failure surface that represented the
conditions observed based on the on-going monitoring and
inclinometer data. Anchors were then sized and spaced such
that the factor of safety was increased to 1.35 given the same
parameters.

Fig. 7. Typical Section.
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The stabilization design called for two rows of Manta Ray
anchors at 10-ft [3-m] vertical spacing, and horizontal spacing
ranging from 7 to 9 ft [2.1 to 2.7 m]. These anchors are
typically driven into the soil. Once installed, the anchor head
is pulled and a “tipping plate” at the end of the anchor locks

5

into the surrounding soil. At the start of anchor installation,
the contractor encountered anchor refusal before installation to
the required depth; therefore, the anchors were installed into
predrilled holes. Initially, there were doubts as to whether the
tipping plate would fully open within the weathered rock;
however, installation of the Manta Ray anchors proceeded
smoothly. The anchor load was distributed using a 3.5 ft × 2.5
ft [1.1 m × 0.8 m] steel plate.

the upper portion of the wall was $40,000 or about $16/s.f.
[$172/ m2]. Additional repairs to utilities and regrading were
performed in conjunction with the wall repair at a cost of
about $50,000; therefore the total rehabilitation cost was
$130,000 ($26/s.f. [$280/m2]).
Other MSE Stabilization Measures
In addition to the methods presented in these case histories;
other means have been used to stabilize MSE walls that have
shown signs of distress. Figure 11 shows an SRW that was
stabilized using soldier piles and tiebacks. Wood lagging was
placed between the piles and the space between the existing
SRW facing and the lagging was filled with open graded
stone.

Fig. 9. Anchor Installation.
During construction of these stabilization measures, it was
found that the upper rows of wire forms were not sufficiently
stable to support the anchors and bearing plates. The upper 8
ft± [2.4 m] of the MSE wall were removed and reconstructed
using a modified wrapped face detail, increased geogrid
lengths, and sand backfill. These modifications enhanced
stability of the structure and allowed the contractor to
eliminate anchors from portions of the wall with an exposed
height of less than about 13 ft [4 m].

Fig. 11. Stabilization using Soldier Piles/Lagging w/Tiebacks.
For another project, helical anchors and soldier piles were
used to stabilize an SRW (see Fig. 12). Other methods include
construction of an earth berm in front of the wall (partial or
full height) or structural buttressing from the exposed face.

Fig. 10. Upper portion of wall was reconstructed.
The entire 5,000 s.f. [465 m2] of wrap face wall was stabilized
and/or reconstructed. The cost of anchor stabilization was
$40,000 or about $8/s.f. [$86/m2], and the cost to reconstruct
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Fig. 12. Helical Anchor Stabilization.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The repair or reconstruction of MSE walls can be achieved
through various methods. These methods should be chosen
based on the failure mechanism the MSE structure is
exhibiting, along with the most cost effective solution based
on site constraints.
In cases where a complete collapse of a wall has occurred,
reconstruction is the most obvious solution. Although in
many cases some of the materials (i.e., facing elements) can be
re-used, reconstruction of the wall is typically more costly
than the original construction. Reasons for this increased cost
include:
• Cost of clean-up and dismantling of the existing structure
• Additional conservatism built into the redesign by the
engineer
• Cost of additional features to enhance internal drainage
• Cost of imported backfill to expedite construction or
because the on-site soils are considered unsuitable
If reconstruction is for only a portion of the wall that
collapsed, the integrity of the remainder of the wall will often
remain in question. A full geotechnical investigation and
evaluation may be required, and the results of this evaluation
may necessitate some remedial work over the remainder of the
structure.
The selection of a stabilization method should be dependent
upon the mode of failure or displacement of the MSE wall. In
cases where the internal stability of the reinforced mass or
facing system is in question, methods such as soil nailing may
further reinforce the mass to provide an adequate factor of
safety. Where external and global stability are of concern,
tiebacks extending beyond the anticipated failure plane would
be a more appropriate means of stabilization. One concern
with the use of either driven or helical type anchors is that
these types of anchors are usually terminated at refusal. If the
anchor refuses at a length that does not extend through the
failure plane, it has done nothing to enhance the stability of
the structure.

Fig. 14. Tiebacks to repair global stability problem.
Costs of tiebacks and soil nails in this application are
comparable, depending on the site conditions.
SRW
construction cost is typically on the order of $15 to $25/s.f.
[$160/m2 to $270/ m2], approximately half of which is
materials. Dismantling an SRW is estimated at about $10/s.f.
[$110/ m2], and the use of select backfill could increase the
cost by as much as $12/s.f. [$110/ m2] (assuming a 20 ft
reinforcement length). Therefore, complete teardown and
reconstruction of a geosynthetically reinforced SRW could be
$40/s.f. [$430/ m2] or more, assuming that the block facing
can be salvaged and reused. It should be noted that these costs
are estimates by the authors, based on experience with these
technologies and estimates contained in Site Work and
Landscape Cost Data (Balboni, ed., R.S. Means Company,
Inc., 2002).
Table 5 summarizes costs of various stabilization methods.
Costs for all methods except for reconstruction were obtained
from FHWA (Munfakh et al., 1999) and increased by roughly
20 percent (at the low end of the range given) to account for
complications related to MSE stabilization.
Table 5. Comparison of Costs for SRW Stabilization
Method
Reconstruction
Soil Nails
Soldier Pile/Lagging (anchored)
Concrete Counterfort Wall

Cost per s.f
[m2]
$20 - $50
[$215 - $540]
$18 - $55
[$195 - $590]
$18 - $75
[$195 - $805]
$30 - $60
[$320 - $645]

It should be noted that for the stabilization measures, the entire
SRW wall height may not require stabilization (as in Case
History 2); therefore, these costs could be significantly less
than wall reconstruction.
Fig. 13. Soil nails to repair compound stability problem.
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